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One of the most pressing questions in#the ongoing European debates about the
Digital Services Act#(DSA) proposal is the question of dominance,#and specifically the
question of the disproportionate power and societal impact of dominant services on
online speech and the#fundamental rights of users.
With the DSA proposal, the European Commission aims to provide a new regulatory
framework for the responsibility of#online#services in the EU#internal market.
Specifically, the DSA departs from the self-regulatory paradigm for online service
responsibilities. It#sets out to overcome the existing fragmentation and regulatory
gaps by defining clear and proportionate obligations#for online services with regard
to illegal content and content moderation practices more generally, which reflect the
difference in resources and societal impact of the various actors on the market. In
the intention of the Commission, legal clarity should, in turn, translate into a safer
online environment, where providers are held accountable and users’ fundamental
rights (in particular, freedom of expression, privacy and data protection, non-
discrimination and right to an effective legal remedy) are duly protected.
Thus, the#DSA aims at providing a harmonized regulatory framework for#addressing
online harms, while protecting users’ fundamental rights. However, there is a risk
that imposing accountability at the threat of fines might increase the power of already
dominant intermediaries. This problem is particularly evident for content moderation,
where the DSA framework threatens to further#strengthen the role of Big Tech in
determining what is acceptable online speech.#Over the last decades, a handful
of services have consolidated their position as the primary arbiters of speech and
online activity. The fact that#Facebook is actively calling for increased regulation,
widely considered to be informed by a wish to further consolidate its power, may
serve as a warning for the potential anti-competitive impacts of regulation such as
the DSA.
In this contribution, we discuss#the question of whether the DSA#can be expected
to further#entrench the#power of dominant services.#First, we consider how the DSA
impacts the relative competitiveness of dominant and smaller services, and how
the economics of content moderation tend to favour very large online platforms
(VLOPs). Second, we focus on a selection of provisions in the DSA and how these
have the potential to entrench VLOPs‘ dominance and private power, while providing
suggestions for better safeguards.
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The Likely Economic Impact of the DSA
We can start with the question whether the DSA#can significantly alter the power
dynamics underlying innovation and competition in the market of intermediary
services.#While the DSA focuses on issues of liability for illegal content and
responsibility in content moderation processes#more generally, a separate proposal,
theDigital Markets Act (DMA), aims to address issues of competition in digital
markets. General issues of economic dominance and monopoly power will have to
be addressed through competition law and the DMA.
With the DSA, a central goal#for the European Commission (EC), related to
competition, is to overcome legal fragmentation with a set of harmonized rules
and provide “the conditions for innovative digital services to emerge and scale up
in the internal market” (Recital 4).#Legal fragmentation has been a problem since
the adoption of the eCommerce Directive (ECD), which left crucial details to self-
regulation and national law.#In the last years, fragmentation has further increased
as a result of legislative developments at the national level (such as the German
NetzDG). While a more harmonized framework would certainly benefit dominant
companies, well-positioned to respond to a more strictly harmonized EU regulatory
environment, a recurring fear is that smaller service providers might falter.
However, theEC’s#Impact Assessment accompanying the DSA proposal#is very
positive about the benefits of overcoming fragmentation for smaller companies: they
would be able to scale up their offerings in a more robust#EU market. Focusing on
the increased cross-borders turnover resulting from harmonization, the EC estimates
a cost reduction of around 400.000 € per annum for a medium enterprise operating
in three Member States and of 4 million € for the same company operating in 10
Member States. In the EC’s view, the cost savings would be particularly beneficial to
micro and small enterprises, who encounter prohibitive costs when offering services
in more than two Member States.
Although the EC acknowledges that#compliance with the DSA obligations entails
additional#costs for all hosting service providers, according to its calculations,
however, these costs would be lower#than#those of#facing a fragmented legal
environment. Estimating the DSA-related expenditures is complicated though, as
these costs are highly dependent on the volume of notices received by the individual
service provider.
Overall, the EC’s#assessment report does not warrant#the conclusion that the costs
of DSA#compliance would be prohibitive for SMEs and/or disproportionately affect
them vis-à-vis VLOPs. Notably, though, the calculations on costs and administrative
burdens at company level are not exhaustive on the economic impact of the DSA:
for instance, the costs for out-of-court dispute settlement are not included, and the
impact assessment’s tables only refer to the costs of notice and action procedures,
while it is unclear if this covers the moderation of harmful/undesirable (but not
necessarily illegal) content. The impact assessment’s calculations should therefore
be taken with a grain of salt.
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In addition, the economic#considerations found in the#Impact Assessment primarily
relate to the first policy goal of the DSA – strengthening the Digital Single
Market by removing legal fragmentation – and#do not necessarily capture the
broader#economics underlying content moderation today. In the absence of a
complete overhaul of platform governance,#the economics of content moderation
significantly benefit larger companies. First, the reduction of costs through
legal harmonization does not per se translate into#an ability of smaller actors to
scale up and compete with the big ones.#Content moderation of internationally
operating social media services also entails significant investments in#personnel
(including#moderators)#with relevant expertise on language, politics, culture,
government relations#and other jurisdictional specifics, with significant efficiency
gains for larger services.#The possibilities of automation in detecting and addressing
illegal and harmful content issues are likewise significantly greater for services with
the largest volume of user activity and content#notices.# Arguably, the higher costs
envisaged for VLOPs are marginal, compared to their structure and turnover, and
their established risk management procedures.
In summary, addressing legal fragmentation will have some important#benefits for
small service providers, but#this will likely benefit large service providers as well
– if not more – and not affect their ability to dominate. But of course, the question
of digital dominance and content moderation extends beyond the economics of
content moderation to#the other two key policy objectives of the DSA: addressing
online#harms and protecting users’ fundamental rights.
Beyond the Economic Impact
The DSA proposal keeps the basic intermediary liability safe harbor regime of the
ECD#in place (Articles 3-5 DSA). The importance#of a harmonized safe harbor regime
is likely significant for smaller service providers. On the contrary, for larger service
providers that are actively moderating content, one could raise the question if a safe
harbor is#still warranted. While we do not support such proposals, considering their
probable negative impact on fundamental rights, any initiative to condition the safe
harbors on compliance with particular due diligence obligations should be restricted
to dominant service providers, to prevent further harm to the competitiveness
of smaller players.#More importantly, in our view, there are a number of noted
uncertainties about the#applicable scope of the DSA’s safe harbors and due diligence
framework, in particular in relation to search engine, infrastructural,#messaging, and
ancillary services. There is a risk that the legal certainty provided by the DSA will be
the greatest for dominant social media and marketplace services.
The DSA continues, and in some ways further#reinforces, the tendency to outsource
primary decisions on fundamental rights and speech governance to platforms. This
“privatized enforcement” phenomenon is present in many of#the DSA procedures
for tackling illegal content, including#orders to act against illegal content#in Article 8
and 9 DSA, the#notice-and-takedown mechanisms#in Article 14 DSA, the#measures
and protection against misuse#in#Article 20 DSA and the notification of suspicions
of criminal offences in Article#21 DSA. This tendency combines with the incentives,
also present in the DSA, towards over-removal of lawful content in order to avoid
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fines.#The complaint procedure of#Article 17 DSA is also noteworthy in this regard.
# It#provides users with an ability to contest undue removals#of content by online
platforms. But it also places the responsibility for operating these procedures on the
platforms#and does not impact the discretion of online platforms to act on the basis
of their terms of service.#This, in combination with the proposed regime for out-of-
court dispute settlement, highlights the extent to which content moderation is steered
away from more robust judicial processes, which more robustly guarantee users’
fundamental rights.
The risk-based approach for content moderation imposed on VLOPs raises some
additional concerns in this regard. The risk assessment will involve a complex
balancing exercise#between fundamental rights and other policy objectives
(the eradication of online harm and disinformation, in particular)#by dominant
online platforms. The only stakeholders with some leverage over these risk
assessments are the European#Board for Digital Services (composed of the national
regulators)#and the EC. Specifically, Article 27 DSA requires them to recommend
best practices for VLOPs to mitigate the systemic risks identified either in the
assessment under Article 26 DSA or through data access and transparency
reporting. Once such balancing has been conducted and guidelines have been
issued, VLOPs are easily provided with an additional line of#defense in imposing
their standards for content moderation on users. Additional clarity is needed on the
precise focus of the risk assessments, to prevent this new framework from becoming
captured by dynamics between dominant platforms and regulators#to the detriment of
users.
Article 12 DSA proposal#obliges intermediaries to provide information on any
restrictions applied for the purpose of content moderation,#and to act in a diligent,
objective and proportionate manner, with due regard for the fundamental rights
of users.#Dominant online platforms’ terms of service exert a particularly strong
influence on users’ fundamental rights, shaping the boundaries of legitimate online
speech globally. Within the current text, the proportionality standard could be used
to give horizontal effect to freedom of expression. But Article 12#DSA could more
explicitly take into#account the dominance of particular#online platforms. It#could
incorporate stricter standards for dominant services, limiting their discretion in
moderating speech#on matters of public concern. Given the exceptional power#over
speech of the VLOPs, Article 12 DSA could#more generallyclarify that fundamental
rights are applicable in the horizontal relation between them and the users and
require VLOPs to follow human rights law standards for online content moderation.
Conclusion
This discussion has looked at how the problem of digital dominance is affected by
the DSA proposal. While the DSA proposal tries to not aggravate this situation –
and we can agree with the EC that addressing legal fragmentation helps#smaller
companies operating in the EU – there is no doubt that the economics of content
moderation strongly benefit larger companies. Outside of a restructuring of the
market (through the lens of economic regulation and competition law), obligations on
companies to address online harms and at the same time protect fundamental rights
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end up playing into the hands of dominant companies. Within its current scope,
what should be expected from the DSA is to include robust safeguards for users,
minimize privatized enforcement dynamics and put more focus on the horizontal
effect of fundamental rights, including to limit the discretion of dominant players.
These elements could be complemented by stronger restrictions on the business
models of dominant platforms (notably based on pervasive tracking and targeting
of their users and attention-maximizing algorithms), which have#been linked to the
spread of harmful content and to a variety of other individual and societal risks,
including some of the issues identified by the DSA as “systemic risks”. While we
cannot expect the DSA (considering its scope and focus) to solve the issues of
dominance in content moderation, several improvements are warranted to limit the
exceptional power of the big actors in content moderation and thus support a better
protection of fundamental rights and key societal interests.
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